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1. Introduction 
The last decade has seen substantial progress in improving the quality of micro-
data on both income and wealth. Some of these developments are documented in recent 
papers by Juster and Smith (1997), Juster, Lupton, Smith and Stafford (under review, 
2001), and Hurd, Juster and Smith (under review, 2001). These papers explore a number 
of quality enhancements: the use of unfolding brackets for income or wealth components 
that convert “don’t know” or “refusal” responses into quantitative imputations that 
contain measurement error but little or no bias; the use of improved estimates of changes 
over time in wealth and active saving to generate measures of capital gains or losses; the 
use of a merged questionnaire sequence that integrates survey questions about asset 
holdings and income flows from these assets to reduce the bias in estimates of income 
from capital; and finally, matching of the periodicity specified in income questions to the 
actual periodicity of income receipts as a way to enhance the quality of reports for certain 
income categories. 
These enhancements of survey data on income and wealth, while substantially 
improving the quality of the cross section data, do not come without a cost. A major 
problem associated with any change made to the methodology used in a panel survey is 
that they tend to produce time series inconsistencies. By definition, quality improvements 
reduce the bias and/or measurement error of the cross section point estimate but, by doing 
so, introduce a bias in the estimate of the change over time.  
One way to avoid producing such a time series inconsistency is to freeze the 
survey technology, thus eliminating any quality enhancement. As a long run strategy, this 
is clearly a bad idea – robust empirical findings cannot be obtained from poor data. A 
preferred alternative would be to develop methods of recovering time series consistency  
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in the face of data enhancements. In this paper, we explore methods of recovering time 
series consistency in the measurement of income from capital in the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS).  
Respondents in both Waves 1 (1992) and 2 (1994) of the HRS were asked to 
report all sources of income in a stand-alone series of questions. The conventional view is 
that these questions should be reported together since they all have the characteristic of 
being resource flows. In a separate set of questions, the value of household assets and 
liabilities were obtained. Again, the idea was that these are all stock values and thus 
should be grouped together. However, while this classification of flows and stocks into 
separate groups is useful from the perspective of the researcher, it may not be the 
optimum question structure from the viewpoint of the survey respondent. Given that the 
source of asset income is the asset itself, it makes sense to integrate stocks and flows in a 
way that allows the survey respondent to consider these dollar amounts at the same time. 
This innovation was implemented in the HRS beginning in Wave 3 (1996) and continues 
to be the methodology used in all following waves including Wave 4 (1998) and Wave 5 
(2000). Hurd, Juster and Smith (2001) examine the effect of this data collection 
enhancement and find that the income from capital almost doubles between Waves 2 and 
3, suggesting the reduction of a serious bias resulting from the stock/flow separation of 
asset amounts and income. And as noted in that paper, other surveys, such as the Current 
Population Survey, also suggest a serious underestimate of income from assets using the 
conventional survey design that has income from assets reported in one module and the 
assets reported in a separate module. 
Although clearly indicating a substantial improvement in the measurement of 
asset income, the mean doubling between Waves 2 and 3 of the HRS is problematic for  
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researchers wishing to utilize the panel aspect of the survey. The results of any time 
series study of HRS asset income will be dominated by this technology change in data 
collection. To correct the problem we propose a strategy that utilizes the distribution of 
the rates of return obtained in the unbiased data. Random imputation of asset income 
rates of return in Waves 1 and 2, using Wave 3 as the donor distribution, are used with 
the asset values of Waves 1 and 2 to generate an estimate of asset income.  
Two crucial assumptions are required if this strategy is to be successful. First, it is 
assumed that although there is a time series inconsistency in the estimate of asset income, 
the estimates of asset values are not contaminated by this bias. We provide evidence that 
the measurement of asset values is indeed consistent over time and that the major source 
of bias in the rate of return to assets stems from the measurement of asset income. 
Second, the donor distribution must be an adequate representation of the true distribution 
in the time period where the imputations are being made. To determine how robust our 
strategy is to this assumption, we provide imputed estimates based on donor distributions 
coming from HRS Waves 3, 4 and 5. The stability of the imputed estimates across donor 
distributions is noteworthy. 
In the next section, we examine the HRS data on household financial wealth and 
income flowing from that wealth. We discuss the possibility of  various sources of 
measurement error in the time series across Waves 1 through 5 and provide the mean rate 
of return to financial assets in these years. In Section 3, we outline three imputation 
procedures and discuss their relative advantages and disadvantages. These procedures are 
applied to the HRS asset income data and the results are reported in Section 4. The 
robustness of each procedure is examined as are the various imputation strategies. 
Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.  
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2. Survey Structure Induced Bias in the HRS Financial Asset Income 
Financial wealth in the HRS is defined as the sum of four components: checking, 
saving and money market accounts; CD’s, savings bonds and Treasury bills; publicly 
traded corporate equities and equity mutual funds; and corporate bonds. Each of these 
potentially yields some amount of asset income. Data from the 1992 and 1994 data are 
based on the conventional survey format while the 1996, 1998 and 2000 data are based 
on the revised format that integrates questions about asset holdings with questions about 
income from assets. In the conventional format, respondents are asked whether they own 
any of the four financial assets, or any investment real estate or business or farm equity, 
and how much they own if they report owning any. In a later section of the questionnaire, 
respondents are asked about income from a variety of sources (wages or salary, workers 
compensation, veterans benefits, business income, rent, Social Security, pensions, interest 
or dividends, etc.). In the revised question sequence, households are asked whether they 
have each of the four asset components noted above. If the respondent claims to own a 
particular asset, they are asked about its value and, if greater than zero, whether they 
received any dividend or interest income from that asset. If they claim to have asset 
income, they are ask how much and how often. Similar question sequences are asked for 
each of the four types of financial assets.  
Gross differences in the reporting of financial assets and income from those assets 
across the five waves are enormous. These are shown in Table 1. In 1992 and 1994, only 
about a third of the sample reported income from financial assets while almost two-thirds 
reported zero income from assets. These proportions were approximately reversed in 
1996, 1998 and 2000, with almost two-thirds reporting income from assets and a bit more 
than one-third reporting zero income from assets. Interestingly enough, the proportion of  
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the sample reporting ownership of financial assets is essentially the same on all five 
waves: the fraction owning financial assets is a bit over 80% in 1992, and goes up 
slightly in each later year as one would expect during a vigorous economic expansion.  
Another way to look at the linkage between assets and income from assets is to 
examine the proportion of the sample reporting zero income from assets within different 
asset percentiles across survey years. This is provided in Table 2. In the lowest asset 
category (zero to the 25
th percentile), the proportion of the sample reporting zero income 
from assets is over 90% in all five survey years, although it is a bit higher in 1992 and 
1994 than in 1996, 1998, or 2000. The differences by year become substantial when we 
look at higher asset percentiles. For example, in the 90
th percentile and above, the 1992 
and 1994 proportions of households reporting zero income from assets are, respectively, 
22% and 36%, extraordinarily high numbers for households in the upper 10% of the 
financial asset distribution. Integrating the survey questions on asset income into the asset 
and liabilities module reduces the proportion of households reporting zero income from 
assets to about 3% in that percentile group. Substantial differences in the fraction of 
households reporting zero income from assets also show up in the 25
th-50
th percentile, in 
the 50
th-75
th percentile, and in the 75
th through the 90
th percentile. In the 25
th-50
th 
percentile, the fraction of households reporting zero income from assets goes from about 
80% using the conventional survey format to between 40 and 50% using the revised 
format The fraction reporting zero goes from over 50% in the conventional mode to about 
12% in the revised mode in the 50
th-75
th percentile, while going from about a third in 
1992 and 1994 to around 5% in 1996, 1998 and 2000 in the 75
th-90
th percentile. 
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c contain a more detailed picture of the change in income from 
financial assets and in asset holdings over the five survey years and over the percentile  
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distribution of financial asset holdings. The pattern of the data in these tables is very 
consistent. In Table 3a, which has mean income from financial asset holdings by 
percentiles of financial asset holdings, the full sample means in 1992 and 1994 are 
roughly 50% of the means in 1996, 1998 or 2000. This across year mean difference stems 
largely from differences among households whose financial asset holdings are in the 75
th 
percentile or higher. For example, in the 90
th-100
th percentile, mean asset income is about 
$8,000 in 1992 and 1994, but about $18,000, $22,000 and $23,000 in 1996, 1998 and 
2000, respectively – roughly a three-fold increase. In contrast, in the 50
th-75
th percentile, 
the 1996, 1998 and 2000 data look to be about the same size as the 1992 data, all of 
which are higher than the 1994 mean. 
Table 3b contains mean financial asset holdings across asset holding percentile 
groups. No pattern difference is evident between the 1992-1994 data and the 1996-1998-
2000 data. By year, the mean grows substantially, as one would expect during a period of 
economic prosperity with substantial capital gains. In the 50
th-74
th percentile, the mean 
grows from roughly $15,000 to slightly over $22,500 – a 50% increase over the eight-
year period. In the 90
th+ percentile group, the mean grows from around $300,000 in 1992 
to about $650,000 in 2000 – roughly a two-fold increase. Thus the pattern that one would 
expect in the absence of any survey innovation is exactly what one finds in Table 3b. 
Mean financial asset holdings grows steadily and substantially over the 1992 to 2000 
period with no indication that the growth rate is affected by the transition from 
conventional survey methods to the revised method. Generally speaking, the growth rates 
over the entire period tend to average about 9% per year with growth being larger in the 
higher percentiles than in the lower ones.  
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The effect of the revised survey format conditioned on asset holdings is presented 
in Table 3c which provides the mean of the average rate of return to financial assets, 
defined as the ratio of financial asset income to financial assets. Note that this is a mean 
of individual rates rather then the ratio of the means from Tables 3a and 3b. The mean 
average rate of return over all households increases by roughly 50% from the 
conventional format to the revised format. This pattern can be seen across the asset 
groups as well. For households with financial assets above the 90
th percentiles, the mean 
of the average rate of return jumps from 3.3% and 2.4% in 1992 and 1994, respectively, 
to 4.6% in 1996 after which it stays relatively constant. As evident from Table 3c as well 
as Table 3a, the asset income data from 1994 seems to be particularly anomalous. One 
could also argue that the mean average rates of return in 1996 seem to be anomalously 
above the values in 1998 and 2000. This possibility is considered in more detail below. 
  The data displayed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 make it clear that time-series analysis of 
the effect of income change on various types of behavior would be greatly aided if the 
income component that reflected the return on financial assets could be adjusted to ensure 
consistency. The problem is that all datasets using the conventional HRS survey design 
(asking about a long set of income components, including dividends and interest income) 
will seriously underestimate income flows from financial assets and hence overstate the 
change across the conventional and revised survey years.  
There are at least two potentially important ways in which biased m easurement 
error is introduced into reported financial income from 1992 and 1994 – error in reporting 
having any asset income, and error in reporting the value of asset income conditional on 
having any at all. As indicated in Table 2, a striking features of the quality enhancement 
in measuring income from capital is that the merged question sequence converts the  
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proportion of respondents who report zero asset income from 71% in Wave 2 to 38% in 
Wave 3. Even more striking is that the merged module converts t he proportion of 
households with financial assets above the 90
th percentile who reported zero interest or 
dividend income from 36% in Wave 2 to 2.3% in Wave 3. Thus, one possibility could be 
that the bias in reported financial income is generated solely by households who actually 
have but report no asset income. This would imply no bias among households who 
reported asset income and thus require the imputation of only those households who 
report owning assets but no asset income. If we limit comparisons to  households 
reporting some asset income in each year we might find the same degree of time series 
consistency that we find in the level of asset holdings from Table 3b. If that were true, we 
could focus on devices for imputing values to households that reported owning financial 
assets with no asset income in Waves 1 and 2 based on relationships observed in wave 3. 
To examine this hypothesis, Table 4 reproduces Table 3c for households who 
report positive income from financial assets. Among all households, the mean average 
rate of return for 1992 and 1994 seems much more in line with those from the later 
waves. However, this masks some remaining time series inconsistencies across the 
financial asset distribution. The average rate of return for households with financial assets 
above the 90
th percentile, households with by far the most asset income on average (Table 
3a),  remains roughly 40% lower in 1992 and 1994 than in 1996, 1998 or 2000. Thus, 
while the elimination of households who report no asset income alleviates some of the 
time series inconsistency, it fails to do so for the most relevant households, i.e. 
households with significant asset income. This is strong evidence against the hypothesis 
that the only survey induced bias is among households reporting  no asset income. The  
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existence of survey structure induced bias appears to be present both in households 
reporting positive asset income as well as in those reporting zero asset income. 
3. Imputation Strategy 
The average rates of return reported in Table 3c are not only evidence of the 
measurement error in asset income from Waves 1 and 2 of the HRS, but also suggest a 
possible solution to correcting the problem. As noted above, there is a high degree of 
consistency in financial wealth across all waves in the HRS. The time series consistency 
is a product of the fact that the survey instrument did not change over the years. 
Furthermore, the use of a follow-up sequence of unfolding bracket questions for 
respondents reporting ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse’ in the collection of asset and liability data, 
combined with random imputation within brackets, greatly minimizes any bias in the 
measurement of financial wealth. The result is that, while the time series consistency of 
financial asset income is clearly suspect, the reliability of measured financial wealth is 
strong.
1 It is thus possible to use the rates of return computed for the 1996 data to assign a 
rate of return to households in 1992 and 1994. These rates of return can then be combined 
with the financial wealth d ata for those households to impute a reliable measure of 
financial asset income. 
To implement this strategy, a number of issues must first be resolved. The first 
issue involves specifying which households should be assigned a new rate of return. 
Throughout, we restrict attention to those households who report owning some financial 
assets. While this neglects households who may have owned financial assets at some 
point over the survey year but sold them prior to the survey date these cases are likely to 
be rare and we see no simple way of handling them. We consider two strategies for 
                                                 
1 Note that unfolding brackets were implemented in the collection of asset income in all waves except 
Wave 1. This makes the reliability of asset income in Wave 1 even more suspect.  
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imputing financial asset income to households with positive financial assets. As 
suggested above, one strategy (A) would be to assign a new rate of return only to those 
who report no asset income. However, this does nothing about the survey induced bias 
for households who do report asset income. An alternative strategy (B) would be to 
impute a rate of return to all households including those that report asset income. This 
completely replaces the asset income from Waves 1 and 2 with imputed data. Strategies 
(A) and (B) represent two extremes. We present results from both. 
The second issue is what rate of return to assign each household. The simplest 
imputation method is to assign the mean or median rate of return from Wave 3 
households to households in Waves 1 and 2 using either strategy (A) or (B). However, 
this has at least one serious drawback. Assigning the same rate of return eliminates all 
heterogeneity in the rate of return. The average rate of return to financial wealth is a 
product of portfolio choice across different asset groups (equities, bonds, checking and 
saving) as well as the choice and performance of the chosen individual assets within each 
asset group. Assigning the mean rate of return neglects this important individual choice 
variation. A better approach is to assume that individual choice regarding portfolio 
selection remains relatively constant and to apply each individual household’s financial 
asset income rate of return in Wave 3 to the financial assets held in Wave 1 and 2. This is 
problematic for households that have financial assets in Wave 1 or 2 but do not in Wave 
3. To impute a rate of return to these households while still maintaining the empirical 
heterogeneity of the donor distribution, a rate of return is randomly drawn (with 
replacement) from the donor distribution for each household. This is the approach we 
take. For strategies (A) and (B), all households being imputed receive a randomly drawn 
rate of return. A third strategy (C) is to impute a rate of return to all households as in (B)  
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but use the household’s actual rate of return from Wave 3 if one is available and 
randomly impute if no Wave 3 rate of return is available. 
The implementation of a random imputation procedure raises the issue of what 
donor distribution to use. The imputation procedure used to impute missing values for 
assets and liabilities relies on the donor distribution from the bracket in which the 
respondent claims their asset value resides.
2 No such information is available regarding 
the rate of return to financial assets. One approach is to use the entire rate of return 
distribution from Wave 3. However, this is problematic for several reasons. Foremost is 
the fact that along with actual rates of return, the zero’s must be included in the donor 
distribution since households reporting zero asset income in Waves 1 and 2 are a large 
source of the bias that needs to be corrected. The probability of having zero asset income 
is larger for households with small amounts of financial wealth since this wealth is less 
likely to have large fractions of high yielding assets such as equities and bonds. 
Furthermore, the result of classical measurement error is greatly magnified for low 
financial wealth households since these values are in the denominator of the variable of 
interest, i.e. the average rate of return. Imputing a high rate of return to a large asset value 
would grossly overestimate the true asset income value. Finally, one could make a 
behavioral argument that households with higher levels of financial wealth are more 
likely to have portfolios dominated by equities and bonds, both of which have higher 
yields than checking and savings accounts. For these reasons and for the fact that reliable 
financial wealth data is observable in all waves of the data, donor distributions of the rate 
of return are computed for various financial wealth groups and applied to the same 
groups in the data to be imputed. The asset groups considered in this paper are the first 
                                                 
2 The number of households refusing to not knowing the bracket information is surprisingly low. See Juster 
and Smith (1997) for more details.  
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three quartiles of financial wealth along with the 75
th to 90
th and 90
th and above percentile 
groups.
3 As a result of the donor distributions varying by asset level, strategy (C) only 
uses the household’s actual Wave 3 rate of return if its asset value in Wave 1 or 2 falls in 
the same asset group as Wave 3. 
The fourth issue that needs to be considered is the treatment of outliers. Although 
our results rest on the assumption that the reported financial wealth from all waves and 
asset income values from Waves 3 and later are unbiased, classical measurement error is 
still a problem. These errors yield unrealistic rates of return in Wave 3 which could, in 
turn, get imputed to households in Waves 1 and 2. The standard treatment of outliers in 
empirical work is to trim. In the present case, this would entail dropping some values 
from the top of each financial asset group’s donor distribution. However, by trimming the 
donor distribution, the result will yield yet another time series inconsistency since the 
donor data have not been trimmed in any such way. Since the goal is to achieve time 
series consistency, we make no attempt to treat outliers and thereby keep them in the 
donor distributions. An alternative which we also consider is to trim the donor 
distributions and apply them for the imputation of not only Waves 1 and 2 but also the 
dropped outliers of Waves 3 and later.  
The final issue is robustness. As noted in the introduction, a crucial assumption 
for the validity of the imputation procedure is that the rate of return distribution, within 
financial asset groups, is the same over time. This may not be true for several reasons. 
First, there have been changes in the way in which certain assets pay out income. For 
instance, there has been a trend for equities to pay out less in dividends in favor of capital 
gains. This suggests a shift downward in the rate of return distribution. Second, 
                                                 
3 Note that these donor groups require that households with no financial wealth in the donor wave be 
dropped since it is not possible to compute a rate of return.  
13 
households could be changing the way in which they allocate their financial wealth 
among assets. The increased household participation in financial markets over the past 
decade suggests a shift up in the rate of return distribution. Conversely, if this increase 
has been the result more of a shift from bonds to equities than from checking and savings 
accounts to either bonds or equities, then this would imply a shift downward in rates of 
return. Finally, the past decade has experienced tremendous growth. Although most of 
this has been reflected in large capital gains, returns to capital in all forms has increased 
suggesting higher rates of return. The net effect of these phenomena is ambiguous. While 
it seems most plausible to use the donor distribution from data collected nearest the 
collection date of the data requiring imputation, i.e. Wave 3 data, robustness is verified 
by applying the same imputations using donor data from Waves 4 and 5 of the HRS. 
An outline of the imputation strategies and procedures considered in this paper are 
provided in Figure 1. We now turn to the results of implementing these procedures. 
4. Imputation Results 
The imputation procedures used in this paper rely heavily on the distribution of 
the rate of return in 1996. The central assumption is that the rate of return distributions 
for Wave 1 and 2 of the HRS are biased downward while the Wave 3 distribution, 
although not free of measurement error, has no such bias. The rate of return distribution 
for Waves 1, 2 and 3 are provided in Table 5a, 5b and 5c, respectively. These rates are 
computed only for households who have financial assets. However, it is important to note 
that there are many households who have a zero average rate of return. 
The survey induced bias is clear by comparing the Wave 3 distribution with that 
of Wave1 and 2. The median rate of return for all households in 1996 is 2.4%. This value 
is zero for households in 1992 and 1994. Moving up the rate of return distribution, the  
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bias remains. The average rate of return in 1996 is 5.7% at the 75
th percentile while only 
being 3.3% and 1.5% in 1992 and 1994, respectively. Not surprisingly, average rates at a 
given percentile are smaller for lower values of financial assets. This is largely a result of 
the fact that the number of households with zero asset income increases. Households with 
small amounts of financial assets are more likely to have a portfolio that yields little to no 
asset income. For households in the lowest asset group, the median rate of return is zero 
in all years of the survey. Nevertheless, the pattern of the bias is consistent. The median 
rate of return for households with financial assets in the 50
th to 75
th percentile is 3.1% in 
1996. In 1992 and 1994, this value remains at zero.  
The importance of stratifying by financial assets is also made clear by Table 5. 
The distributions vary quite substantially by asset group within each year. As noted, this 
is largely influenced by households with zero asset income. This is the dominant effect in 
the distributions across financial asset levels up through the 75
th rate of return percentile. 
However, by the 90
th percentile of the average rate of return, classical measurement error 
in the denominator is seen to dominate. Financial assets are unlikely to yield estimates of 
income flows in the neighborhood of 25% or more, and the cases that fall into these 
categories are almost certainly ones in which there is a very small amount of assets 
combined with a moderate amount of income flow, resulting in an extremely high 
estimate of the rate of return. If one were to look at the details of the cases falling into the 
25% or more rate of return category, one would find a great many cases where the 
average rate of return amounted to several hundred percent or even several thousand 
percent – cases where asset holdings were reported to be a small number like $10, and 
income flows reported to be a moderate amount like $500 or $1000. In general, errors 
that take the form of incorrect recording of the number of zeros are quite likely to result  
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in extremely high rate of return estimates. In 1996, the 90
th percentile of households in 
the lowest asset group is 20%. This is more than twice as large as the 90
th percentile for 
households in the top asset group. The rate of return triples for the lowest group at the 
95
th percentile while only increasing by less than 50% for the highest asset group. 
Clearly, imputing a 60% rate of return to households with large levels of financial assets 
would lead to gross outliers in imputed asset income. These large differences in the 
empirical rate of return distribution across financial assets make it crucial that the random 
imputations stratify on financial assets. 
The main results of this paper are found in Table 6. This table reports mean 
financial asset income by financial asset group using each of the three imputation 
strategies outlined in Figure 1. The un-imputed means are reported in the first row of 
each data year from Table 3a for the purposes of comparison. The imputation method for 
these values is labeled as ‘None’. Recall that Strategy (A) randomly imputes a rate of 
return only to households who report positive financial assets and zero income from those 
assets. The effect on the mean across all households is substantial. Financial asset income 
increases by 36% in 1992 from $1,876 to $2,543. The effect is even larger for the 1994 
data. Imputation strategy (A) increases reported asset income in 1994 by 76% from 
$1,481 to $2,600. Not surprisingly, the largest gains from the imputation in both 1992 
and 1994 go to those with the most financial asset wealth. However, the proportionate 
increase is roughly the same for households with financial assets above the 25
th percentile 
– between 70 and 90%.  
The third row of each data year in Table 6 reports the results of implementing 
Strategy (B). All households with positive financial assets are randomly imputed an 
average rate of return within financial asset groups. This argument for Strategy (B) over  
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Strategy (A) rests on the results from Table 4 which indicated a bias in the mean average 
rate of return time series even among households who reported some financial income. 
Given our priors that the survey induced bias acts to reduce reported asset income, it is 
not surprising that the implementation of Strategy (B) increases mean financial asset 
income from that of Strategy (A). However, the results are not that different for the mean 
across all households. Mean financial asset income is only increased an additional 3.5% 
in 1992 from $2,543 under Strategy (A) to $2,633 under Strategy (B). The 15% increase 
in 1996 is slightly larger. 
The dominant effect of the imputations on the overall mean appears to be a result 
of imputing an average rate of return to households who report zero asset income. 
However, as in Table 4, the overall means mask large differences across the financial 
wealth distribution. The largest difference between Strategy (A) and (B) is evident for 
households with financial wealth above the 90
th percentile. For both 1992 and 1994, 
mean imputed asset income for high wealth households is 31% larger under strategy (B). 
Clearly, the survey induced bias not only increases the number of households reporting 
zero asset income but also significantly reduces the amount of reported asset income. It is 
interesting to note however, that while the imputations under Strategy (B) increase mean 
income by 9% in 1994 over Strategy (A) for households with financial wealth in the 75
th 
to 90
th percentile, the procedure actually reduces the mean in 1992. Of course, both 
strategies increase the mean from the value with no imputations. 
Strategies (A) and (B) reflect two extremes in the way measurement error enters 
reported asset income over the five waves of the HRS. While (A) assumes a reporting 
error only among households that report no asset income and leaves reports of positive 
asset income unchanged, (B) assumes reported asset income of all households is  
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contaminated. While Strategy (C) is closer to (B) in that it imputes asset income for all 
households (with positive financial assets), it uses each particular households rate of 
return from 1996 under the assumption that this rate of return reflects the portfolio 
allocation behavior of the household. The household’s 1996 rate of return is used only if 
they have asset income in both 1996 and the imputation year and if the levels of financial 
wealth in both years are in the same asset group. Otherwise, the method of random 
imputation within asset groups is used. Within each asset group, roughly 50% of the 
cases under Strategy (C) utilize the households’ own 1996 rate of return to impute an 
asset income value in either 1992 or 1994. 
The results from implementing Strategy (C) are reported in the fourth row of each 
data year in Table 6. Relative to the increase from the original data, there is little 
difference between any of the strategies in the overall means of imputed financial asset 
income. The imputation strategies increase the mean by roughly 35-50% in 1992 and by 
75-100% in 1994. Within asset groups, Strategy (B) and (C) are more similar with each 
other than with Strategy (A). The higher the level of financial wealth, the more the results 
for Strategy (A) differ from Strategies (B) and (C). Given the presumed theoretical 
advantages of using the within household portfolio allocation information along with the 
relatively stability between Strategies (B) and (C), Strategy (C) is the imputation 
procedure of choice. 
The goal of the exercise in this paper is to create time series consistency in the 
values of reported financial asset income. The biennial overall mean change in the 
original data over the eight-year period is –21%, 115%, 17% and 7.6%, respectively 
between 1992 and 2000. The seam problem between 1994 and 1996 is glaring. In 
addition, the large fall in asset income between 1992 and 1994 also seems anomalous.  
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Focusing on Strategy (C), the biennial overall mean change of the imputed data between 
1992 and 2000 is 2.6%, 7.7%, 17% and 7.6%. This general upward trend is much more 
consistent with the upward trend in financial assets than is the original data.  
The results presented in Table 6 rely on random imputations using the 1996 
distribution as the donor distribution. To verify the robustness of these results, the same 
imputation strategies are re-done using either the 1998 data or 2000 data as the donor 
distribution. These results are found in Table 7. The table reports the percentage 
difference using the 1998 or 2000 donor distribution from the respective value using the 
1996 donor distribution. Differences in the means across all households are small for 
strategy (A) and (B) but are on the order of 10 to 18% in 1992. The differences are trivial 
in 1994 for the overall mean. The differences become larger for lower asset levels. This is 
to be expected as the base values become smaller. Overall the imputation results appear 
quite robust to the donor distribution. Nevertheless, using the imputations based on the 
1996 distribution seems most advisable since it is the year closest to the years being 
imputed. 
Finally, it is over a broader macroeconomic interest to examine the time series of 
financial asset income net of the effects of outliers. Outliers are handled by dropping the 
top five percent of the donor distributions used in the random imputations. To maintain 
time series consistency, outliers that are trimmed also get imputed using the donor 
distribution from the respective year. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 8. 
Mean financial asset income across all households under Strategies (A) and (B) appear 
less consistent than under Strategy (C). The mean under Stategy (B) in 1992 is $2,080 
and then increases by 2.3%, 42.9%, 10.3% and 2.4% biennially over the following eight 
years. The seam problem still seems apparent between the 1994 to 1996 survey years.  
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Using individual household rate of return information in Strategy (C), mean income in 
1992 is $2,177 and then rises by 9.1% to $2,376 in 1994 and then by an additional 10.3% 
to $2,584 in 1996. There is much more heterogeneity across the financial wealth 
distribution but the conclusion seems to be same: the seam problem introduced by the 
new survey technology in 1996 is eliminated most effectively in the imputed and cleaned 
data under Strategy (C). 
IV. Conclusion 
  In this paper we note the substantial effects of asking survey respondents about 
asset income in a merged asset/income module in which the income question sequences 
directly followed after the asset sequences rather than being asked in a separate income 
module. The inability of many surveys to ascertain accurate asset income data is certainly 
a product of this phenomenon. We go on to note that the improvements made by 
correcting this survey flaw do not come without a cost. This cost is a substantial seam 
problem between the years in which the survey technology is improved. In an attempt to 
improve cross-year consistency in the financial asset income series of the Health and 
Retirement Survey, we propose a number of imputation strategies that take advantage of 
the fact that cross-year consistency is maintained in the levels of financial assets.  
Using various schemes to impute an average rate of return to households in 1992 
and 1994, we are able to establish a time series of financial asset income with similar 
consistency to that of financial wealth. The strategy that yields the best results is one 
which combines a household’s own portfolio allocation information from later waves of 
the data with random imputation of rates of return within various financial asset groups 
where the donor distributions come from the 1996 survey year. These results are notably 
robust to replacing the 1996 donor distribution with that of either the 1998 or 2000  
20 
survey years. A version of this imputation procedure that also accounts for gross outliers 
in the average rate of return yields a time series of financial asset income that is 
consistent with macroeconomic trends. 
Future work will include correcting the income from privately owned business 
farms and real estate. Income from these two assets shares the same time series 
inconsistency as the financial asset income examined in this paper since it was also asked 
in a separate model from the value of the assets. The bias in business, farm and real estate 
asset returns is more difficult to correct since the rates of return are far more idiosyncratic 
than they are for financial wealth. Nonetheless, once these issues are adequately resolved, 
a superiod measure of total household income will be made available. 
 Until then, the results presented here should be a warning to surveyors that 
respondents provide far more accurate measures of financial asset income when preceded 
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(440), 1268-1278. Table 1:  HRS Financial Income and Asset Ownership Across Waves: Percent Reporting Income from Financial Assets
Financial 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Assets Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total
   Yes 35.7 45.4 81.1 29.2 53.2 82.2 62.3 21.0 83.3 63.0 21.3 84.3 60.1 25.1 85.2
   No 0.2 18.8 20.0 0.2 17.4 17.6 0.1 16.7 16.7 0.0 15.8 15.8 0.1 14.8 14.8
Total 35.9 63.2 100.0 29.4 70.6 100.0 62.3 37.7 100.0 63.0 37.1 100.0 60.1 39.9 100.0
Observations 6220 7359 6976 6736 6530[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
1992 98.0 79.1 51.5 32.0 26.2 63.2
1994 97.7 81.9 61.1 47.6 36.3 70.6
1996 93.7 42.5 11.1 5.2 4.5 37.7
1998 92.8 43.7 10.8 5.8 1.3 37.1
2000 92.9 45.7 16.3 6.7 2.3 39.9
Table 2: Percent Reporting Zero Income from Assets by Asset Percentiles
Percentile Group of Financial Assets Year
All 
HouseholdsTable 3a: Mean Income from Financial Assets by Percentiles of Financial Asset Holdings (1996 Dollars)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
1992 25 360 1,081 2,882 8,776 1,876
1994 16 311 706 1,883 7,683 1,481
1996 11 143 1,070 4,680 18,451 3,190
1998 6 163 1,057 4,643 22,545 3,740
2000 31 284 1,015 4,889 23,307 4,024
Table 3b: Mean Financial Asset Holdings in Dollars by Percentiles of Financial Asset Holdings (1996 Dollars)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
1992 13 1,960 14,723 62,493 318,749 51,197
1994 34 2,793 19,047 71,070 369,886 60,887
1996 41 2,479 19,335 80,113 454,030 70,656
1998 30 2,190 18,909 85,009 589,991 88,957
2000 54 2,674 22,550 100,480 649,099 100,539
Table 3c:  Mean Average Rate of Return by Percentiles of Financial Asset Holdings (Percent)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
1992 1.3 3.3 4.7 4.1 3.3 3.7
1994 0.6 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.3
1996 3.9 5.0 5.2 5.8 4.6 5.0
1998 3.0 5.0 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.6









Note: Table 3c presents the mean of individual average rates of return, defined as the ratio of financial asset income to financial assets. This 
requires all households with no financial wealth to be dropped from the sample. In addition, ratios above one are trimmed in the calculation. 
This drops roughly one percent of the sample in each year with most coming from the first quartile (about 3% dropped in the first quartile).Table 4:  Mean Average Rate of Return by Percentiles of Financial Asset Holdings,
               Only Households with Positive Asset Income (Percent)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
1992 14.5 9.0 6.0 4.8 3.2 8.2
1994 11.3 6.0 4.4 5.1 3.3 6.4
1996 9.4 5.9 6.0 5.8 4.6 6.6
1998 9.6 5.9 5.2 4.8 4.6 6.3




Note: Table 4 presents the mean of individual average rates of return, defined as the ratio of financial asset income to financial assets. 
This requires all households with no financial wealth to be dropped from the sample.Table 5a: Distribution of Rate of Return to Financial Assets (Percent), HRS Wave I (1992)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
 5th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
50th 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.6 1.7 0.0
75th 0.0 1.7 4.7 5.0 4.5 3.3
90th 2.6 10.8 13.9 10.0 7.4 10.0
95th 44.4 35.7 25.0 16.3 10.0 23.1
Table 5b: Distribution of Rate of Return to Financial Assets (Percent), HRS Wave II (1994)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
 5th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
50th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0
75th 0.0 0.8 2.4 2.5 2.9 1.5
90th 0.0 8.0 7.1 5.7 5.7 5.8
95th 10.0 16.3 12.5 8.8 8.9 12.0
Table 5c: Distribution of Rate of Return to Financial Assets (Percent), HRS Wave III (1996)
[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
 5th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
10th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0
25th 0.0 0.1 1.0 2.0 1.8 0.0
50th 0.0 1.8 3.1 4.0 3.6 2.4
75th 3.0 5.3 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.7
90th 20.0 12.9 12.0 11.9 9.8 12.1
95th 60.0 21.8 17.0 16.9 14.1 21.5
Precentile
Financial Asset Percentile All 
Households
Precentile
Financial Asset Percentile All 
Households
Precentile
Financial Asset Percentile All 





[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
None 25 360 1,081 2,882 8,776 1,876
(A) 11 565 1,446 4,011 11,675 2,543
(B) 2 272 734 3,745 15,306 2,633
(C) 19 202 958 4,443 18,901 2,886
None 16 311 706 1,883 7,683 1,481
(A) 11 524 1,293 3,622 12,960 2,600
(B) 4 252 996 3,976 17,010 2,984
(C) 6 240 993 3,693 17,256 2,961
1996 None 11 143 1,070 4,680 18,451 3,190
1998 None 6 163 1,057 4,643 22,545 3,740












[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
(A) 9.1 14.3 -1.0 7.3 2.3 5.3
1998 (B) 50.0 38.2 -4.1 25.5 -6.7 2.3
(C) 5.3 -30.7 7.5 20.4 19.8 18.0
(A) -81.8 -12.0 2.8 6.7 2.8 2.9
2000 (B) -450.0 -6.6 5.7 14.5 -2.9 1.8
(C) -31.6 -260.9 5.5 19.1 15.5 10.8
(A) 18.2 16.4 2.9 5.9 -1.7 1.7
1998 (B) 25.0 31.0 2.4 16.8 -16.8 -6.4
(C) 50.0 29.2 -2.4 9.7 -1.5 1.4
(A) -336.4 -28.1 4.9 5.9 0.5 0.7
2000 (B) -925.0 -60.3 11.0 12.6 -3.4 0.1










[0-25%) [25-50%) [50-75%) [75-90%) [90-100%]
(A), trim 6 135 802 3,114 10,855 1,811
(B), trim 5 110 742 3,176 13,642 2,080
(C), trim 4 112 755 3,273 14,419 2,177
(A), trim 2 115 763 2,685 9,614 1,808
(B), trim 2 94 742 3,215 11,681 2,128
(C), trim 2 98 775 3,056 13,967 2,376
1996 trim 1 84 769 3,455 15,732 2,584
1998 trim 0 67 706 3,206 17,996 2,850





1994Figure 1: Imputation Strategies
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